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Abstract
The attempt to govern vast colonial lands with limited European man-
power brought about the system of indirect rule, which was institution-
alized through the Residency system. The local colonial agent usually 
took over the parts of native government vital to the upkeep of the 
revenue flow to the colonial power, such as foreign affairs to prevent 
war; at the same time the native sovereign officially stayed in power. 
This paper compares the extent of intervention of the British in the na-
tive administrations of the princely state Hyderabad and the Protected 
Malay State Pahang between 1857 and 1888. It reveals that while the 
British occasionally interfered in the domestic government of the state 
in Hyderabad, in Pahang they not only permanently interfered in the 
domestic government, but also changed its underlying structure. This 
discrepancy in indirect rule was caused by the opportunity to completely 
take over Pahang’s government due to its instability and simplicity, ac-
companied by a sense of entitlement rooted in their stronger racial bias 
towards the Malayans as compared to the Indians.
Introduction
The period from the 15th to the 20th century – the era of colonialism 
– was characterized by the domination of a few people, mostly from Eu-
rope, over lager numbers of people all over the world. This phenomenon 
is evident in the British Empire, where a group of comparatively small 
islands (Great Britain) had established rule over vast dependent lands, 
mostly in Asia, by the middle of the 19th century. Because an empire 
with such a small center can hardly control such a large periphery, it 
was necessary to minimize the personnel and resources needed to gov-
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ern the dependencies. This was achieved by keeping the native admin-
istration of a controlled state intact and establishing a “co-operative 
relationship between elements of the local ruling or élite classes and the 
colonial power” (indirect rule) (Nicholas 1992: 95).
To employ this strategy, a concept was developed – the Residency 
system – where a so-called Resident, a colonial agent, would be posted 
to a subordinate state’s capital and take over parts of its government, 
while “the old system, as well as its ruling class, retained its legiti-
macy” (ibid.). Implemented first in India, colonial decision-makers on 
the other side of the Bay of Bengal drew from the South Asian example 
(Fisher 1984: 422f.). 
How this practice in a Malayan native state differed from that in an 
Indian native state (a princely state) and to what extent the colonial 
power managed to intervene in the respective native government will 
be analyzed on the basis of two cases between 1857 and 1888. While 
some states were able to retain their sovereignty in parts, others lost 
it completely. The common stance among historians of the Southeast 
Asian region is that the Malayan native states were allowed much less 
sovereignty than the Indian ones. However, it is hard to tell if the Brit-
ish Empire’s more extensive interference in the former’s state affairs 
is connected to their lower view of the Malayan states. While they had 
conceded India the space for a national movement that strived for the 
subcontinent’s independence as early as in the beginning of the 20th 
century, this was not the case in the Malayan colonies as evidenced by 
the commotion caused by Emerson’s Malaysia when it was first pub-
lished in 1937. By using this title, he asserted that the Malayan states 
were culturally equally well-developed.
The Residency system
The aim of the Residency system is to govern a state with the least pos-
sible resources. The British colonial power – first the British East India 
Company and after 1858, through the mandate of the Government of 
India Act, the British Crown – did not have the personnel to adminis-
ter their vast dependencies directly by staffing all the higher positions 
needed to govern a state. In 1939, for instance, 760 British members 
of the Indian Civil Service ruled over 378 million Indians (Low 1973: 8). 
Therefore, another way of ruling a state that required fewer resources 
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had to be found. A Resident was sent to the court of a kingdom to exert 
influence on the local ruler. Sometimes this was set out in writing in the 
form of treaties between the British and the local rulers (native princes), 
though often domains, over which the Resident could dispose, were se-
cured without prior legal negotiations.
The Resident’s official role in the state he was deployed to was to 
give advice to the ruler, at whose court he served. Without regard to 
how much power the Resident actually had over the native ruler, the Ra-
ja’s or Sultan’s official status as the chief of the state was never touched 
(Gullick 1992: 11). Much effort would be spent on perpetuating the 
semblance of the native prince still in power. This was mainly done to 
minimize resistance from the local elite against the foreign interference. 
The cases, where it became too obvious that the Colonial Agent was in 
charge of state affairs, showed unrest among the local court or local 
elites, respectively. This unrest could express itself in intrigues against 
the Resident or ruler, or in outright protest. In order to avoid any loss of 
status on the part of the local ruler, numerous ceremonies were staged, 
who’s highly symbolic meanings were supposed to compensate him for 
his loss of political power. In India, for instance, so-called durbars con-
sisted of giving and taking goods.
The influence that the Resident exerted could differ widely, ranging 
from that over a single domain of government to the whole government 
apparatus. Low has systemized the relationship between the colonial 
power and the local native state – that is the indirectly ruled state – on 
the basis of the degree of sovereignty the latter had left: “Equal partner 
in treaties – subsidiary – annexed state” (Low 1973: 14). The degree 
of sovereignty a state had under indirect rule could range from one 
extreme of this scale to the other. Although states under the Residency 
system were never seen as officially annexed and part of the East India 
Company’s or the Crown’s colonies, some cases lacked only the title of a 
colony, since the Resident had incorporated governmental power wholly. 
However, in most cases the British only seized control over foreign af-
fairs of a native state and claimed to interfere in its internal affairs only 
when it believed to see maladministration or great injustice.
Thus, when analyzing cases of British indirect rule, one discovers a 
certain pattern according to which governmental duties were usually 
taken over and in which order. The first step was always to take over 
the state’s foreign affairs. This was crucial to avoid what was most dan-
gerous to the colonizer’s revenues – war. This measure is common to 
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all cases of indirect rule. Apart from this, Residents tried to intervene in 
the internal affairs of a state’s administration. This was usually done by 
appointing loyal native civil servants to cabinet positions or objecting to 
unwanted candidates until the ruler dismissed them. The most powerful 
cabinet position was that of the chief-minister. If the British, however, 
did not succeed in influencing the decision of who was to fill that posi-
tion, the Resident empowered another office with governmental rights 
and duties and channeled his business through that office. Regardless 
how high a government position, the Resident tried to influence the suc-
cession, at times going as high as to the throne of the ruler.
The realm of the Residency with all its estates and staff, even though 
situated in the respective state’s capital, was not under the state’s laws 
and orders. In fact, the Resident often built up his own jurisdiction in-
dependent of that of the ruler.1 The points, at which the Residency and 
the court intersected, were nonetheless numerous. In order to stay in 
control of the native government, one of the Resident’s main tasks was 
to collect intelligence, so that from a position of superior knowledge 
about the state, its structures and its actors, he would prevail over in-
trigues played against him by court notables that often tried to render 
the Resident powerless. The exclusive control over communication was 
the crucial condition to stay in control over the much larger native elite. 
An important foundation for that was a network of native rulers, court 
notables and other people of importance maintained by pensions from 
the Resident. The Residency system in India was the blueprint for how 
to rule a state indirectly. Even though the core concept of posting a 
Resident to the capital of a state stayed the same wherever practiced, 
the actual exercise of it varied greatly, as will be shown below.
The Residency system in the Malay states
Indirect rule or ‘The Residential System’ was introduced to Malaya be-
tween 1874 and 1895 (Sadka 1970: xiv), a fair one hundred years after 
the first Indian State had seen Residential influence. At this time, the 
British had so-called Straits Settlements – crown colonies – along parts 
of the coast of the Strait of Malacca, which was then and is today the 
most important marine route in Southeast Asia. These colonies included 
the island Penang and vis-à-vis, on the mainland, Province Wellesley, 
both located in the north of the peninsula; the island Singapore at the 
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outmost south of the peninsula; and Malacca, in between the three. In 
the 1840’s tin-mining started to boom in the Malayan States and there-
fore awakened interest within the British administration of the region 
(ibid.). Since then the British had contemplated about how to secure 
their influence over the states of the Malayan Peninsula. Around 1871 
the idea arose to create a system of indirect rule similar to the one that 
had been successfully established in large parts of India (Gullick 1992: 
11). The debaters in the Singapore Government adopted the idea of 
posting colonial officers as agents to exert governmental influence over 
native states. The terms they used were taken from the British Resi-
dency system in India (e.g. Resident, political agent) and they hoped 
to draw from the experience gained there. This marks a transfer of 
knowledge within the colonies of the British Empire – a colonial transfer. 
Eventually the Crown intervened in the Malay states and imposed indi-
rect colonial rule over them, starting with Perak in 1874, then Selangor 
and Negri Sembilan, and in 1888 Pahang.
Following the appointment of a Resident to a Malay state the Sultan 
usually lost all of his governmental power. To compensate for this, he 
was granted increased wealth and especially an increase in the display 
of his status by extensive ceremonies and other formal honors. A trans-
formation took place from political power to symbolical power that was 
not less valuable in the regional context. Ceremonies such as crema-
tions of corpses, and in Bali even living persons, not only embodied 
an entertaining play to satisfy the masses and keep them content, but 
buttressed a ruler’s status (Geertz 1980:100f.). Ceremonies that were 
open to the public had philosophical meanings that depicted the world 
as it works at large and small (ibid.: 104). Also they reflected the social 
organization of a community (ibid.: 117). Many ceremonies also func-
tioned to create a connection between the socially superior and inferior. 
By exchanging symbolic goods or engaging in a certain act or behavior 
the inferior became part of its superior and hence both were bound 
to each other and established or perpetuated their status, respectively 
(ibid.: 106). This worked between human beings as well as between 
humans and gods. Thus the worldly ruler, be he or she Hindu, Muslim 
or otherwise, was connected to his or her superior religious deity. The 
understanding was that the ruler was given its authority by the divine.
(ibid.: 105). In a modern European understanding of power this is a 
decline in potency. In the colonial Southeast Asian understanding of 
power, however, the focus was very much on formal displays of a ruler’s 
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status, on symbolic power. While the discrepancy between political pow-
er and symbolical power was deepened, applying this colonial Southeast 
Asian model of how power is perceived, one may still question, if in this 
understanding the local ruler actually did not lose any power.
The succession of rulers in Malay states became of much interest to 
the British. From 1874 onwards they took great influence on who would 
become Sultan (Sadka 1970: 156). Their choice was not unlimited and 
outwardly free, but they could choose from a few royal family members 
who were entitled to succeed. This way the British could choose a per-
son who was most favorable to them or object to the least favorable 
one, while respecting the local customs of succession. Thus it could 
happen that instead of the son of a deceased Sultan, the deceased’s 
nephew would become the new ruler. For instance, it was customary in 
Perak to rotate the succession of a ruler within the three branches of 
the royal family. However, if the successor next in line was unfitting in 
the eyes of the British, his branch of the royal family was skipped and 
another branch’s member became ruler, as it happened with Raja Yu-
suf, who was passed over three times, in 1857, 1865 and 1871 (ibid.). 
Eventually, through political intrigue, he had managed to be granted the 
title Raja Muda — the title of the first heir — by a former Sultan. Bearing 
this title the British could only ignore his right to succession repeatedly 
at great cost, because ignoring the local customs inevitably created dis-
content among the local elite.
Pahang
In April 1887 the British started to intervene in Pahang’s internal affairs 
heavily. Hugh Clifford was sent to Pahang by the governor to negotiate 
a treaty between Pahang and the British. As stated in the concluded 
treaty, a council was created to advise the Sultan on matters of state 
(Lineham 1936: 112). This put the local Resident in the usual position 
to ‘advise’ the ruler, in this case not only on affairs of foreign relations, 
but on crucial internal affairs of government. These included extensive 
measures such as the reorganization of the sub-state level provinces 
which were traditionally ruled by local chiefs.
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The British changed the lines of borders, which uprooted the traditional 
ruling organization on sub-state level, meant a strong interference in 
state affairs and put the ruler’s revenues at risk. As a consequence the 
ruler of Pahang, Raja Ahmad Yang-dipertuan, took on debt and was 
forced to sell concessions at unrealistically low rates to Singaporean 
business men to exploit the large lands. These business men made 
fortunes from selling the extracted minerals and were often backed by 
European and Chinese companies. The fact that so much of the land 
was given away so cheaply, created large discontent among the local 
chiefs. Soon they were subject to radical change again and the war-
rants under which they had held their land were recalled. This changed 
the territorial chiefs’ status drastically. Also the chiefs’ traditional juris-
diction was abandoned and replaced by an Islamic penal code modified 
by the Kanun, the Pahang laws.
To illustrate the degree to which the British interfered in the govern-
ment of Pahang, the treaty that installed British rule on Pahang is ana-
lyzed below. It was concluded October 8th 1887 between the governor 
of the Straits Settlements Sir Frederick Aloysius Weld and the ruler of 
Pahang, Raja Ahmad Yang-dipertuan.2
Article I
The two Governments will at all times cordially co-operate in the set-
tlement of a peaceful population in their respective neighbouring terri-
tories, and in the joint defence of those territories from external hostile 
attack and in the mutual surrender of persons accused or convicted of 
any crime or offence under such conditions as may be arranged between 
the two Governments.
This was to avoid the crossing of greater colonial interests in the re-
gion by the native state and to avoid war, which was the greatest 
threat to the colonizer’s commercial success and would have put the 
desired revenues at risk.
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The map, taken from Sadka (1970), shows the Malay Peninsula around 1888. The dotted states 
(Pahang, Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan) are the Protected Malay States under indirect rule 
of the British. The states north of the Protected Malay States (Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and 
Perlis) are states under the dominion of Siam. The striped territories are British Crown Colonies 
(Penang, Province Wellesley, Malacca and Singapore) originally acquired for strategic reasons, 
namely to secure the Strait of Malacca for marine trade traffic.
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Article II
His Highness the Raja of Pahang undertakes if requested by the Govern-
ment of the Straits Settlements to co-operate in making arrangements 
for facilitating trade and transit communication overland through the 
State of Pahang with the State of Johor and other neighbouring States.
More trade creates more welfare for the parties involved and in the 
long term more welfare for the colonial power.
Article III
If the Government of the Straits Settlements shall at any time desire to 
appoint a British Officer as Agent to live within the State of Pahang hav-
ing functions similar to those of a Consular Officer, His Highness the Raja 
will be prepared to provide free of cost a suitable site within his territory 
whereon a residence may be erected for occupation by such Officer.
This article granted the Resident to-be a representative estate.
Article IV
Any coinage in the currency of the Straits Settlements which may be 
required for the use of the Government of Pahang shall be supplied to it 
by the Government of the Straits Settlements at rates not higher than 
those at which similar coinage is supplied to Governments of the Malay 
Protected States and under the same limitations as to amount.
His Highness the Raja on his part undertakes that the applications of 
his Government for subsidiary coinage shall be strictly limited by the 
legitimate requirements of the inhabitants of the State of Pahang and 
that the coinage so issued shall be subject to the same limitations as 
regards legal tender as are in force in the Straits Settlements.
This article mainly restricted the local currency to “the legitimate re-
quirements of the inhabitants.” This way it secured that the currency 
of the Straits Settlements was dominant on the Malay Peninsula and 
avoided any dependence of the colonial power’s commercial success 
on exchange rate fluctuations. Also the amount of local and regional 
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coinage was controlled by the government of the Straits Settlements so 
that a native government could not influence the colonial commercial 
success by intended or unintended financial maladministration, for in-
stance, by issuing too much coinage and causing inflation, which would 
have affected the colonial business negatively.
Article V
The Governor of the Straits Settlements will at all times to the utmost of 
his power take whatever steps may be necessary to protect the Govern-
ment and the territory of Pahang from any external hostile attacks, and 
for these or for similar purposes Her Majesty’s Officers shall at all times 
have free access to the waters of the State of Pahang; and it is agreed 
that those waters extend to three miles from the shore of the State.
The British guaranteed the state of Pahang protection from outside en-
emies, which was a vehicle to freely deploy military to this state and 
could be used to build up pressure in the event of conflict between the 
native and the colonial government. Also the sea territory of Pahang 
was limited to only 3 miles from its shore so that any foreign naval traf-
fic could sail outside this territory in safe coastal waters without charge.
Article VI
The Raja of Pahang undertakes on his part that he will not without the 
knowledge and consent of Her Majesty’s Government negotiate any treaty 
or enter into any engagement with any foreign State, or interfere in the 
politics or administration of any native State, or make any grant or con-
cession to other than British subjects or British companies or persons of 
the Chinese, Malay or other Oriental Race, or enter into any political cor-
respondence with any foreign state.
It is further agreed that if occasion should arise for political correspond-
ence between His Highness the Raja and any foreign State, such cor-
respondence shall be conducted through Her Majesty’s Government, to 
whom His Highness makes over the guidance and control of his foreign 
relations.
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The native state completely surrendered the control over its foreign 
relations to the colonial government. This followed the British dogma of 
divide and conquer. As the ruled states could no longer make alliances 
and join forces, they became easier to control. The possible resistance 
of the to-be-ruled subjects was minimized by isolating them from one 
another. Also this article excludes the possibility of doing business with 
any other European colonial power, such as the French or Dutch, who 
also controlled territory in the region.
Article VII
Whereas His Highness the Raja of Pahang has made known to the Gov-
ernor of the Straits Settlements that it is the desire of his Chiefs and 
people that he should assume the title of Sultan, it is further agreed 
that, in consideration of the loyal friendship and constant affection His 
Highness has shown to the Government of Her Majesty and Empress and 
of the stipulations contained in this Memorandum, he and his heirs and 
successors lawfully succeeding according to Malay custom shall in future 
be acknowledged as His Highness the Sultan of Pahang and shall be so 
addressed. [...]
Here the agreement went so far as to grant the Islamic ruling title of 
Sultan to the ruler of Pahang. Usually this title was bestowed upon the 
ruler by a native religious or royal authority.
On December 17th, the British Agent in Pahang, Hugh Clifford, who 
had negotiated the treaty described above, drafted a legal code, which 
was to be introduced as code of law to Pahang. The code, based on the 
English model of legal code, had already been modified to suit local con-
ditions and introduced in the neighboring Protected State of Johor. Apart 
from that, the Resident also suggested the creation of a high court to sit 
in Pahang’s capital Pekan. The power to enforce the code was to be con-
ferred to the local chiefs and village headmen. On January 12th 1888, 
the Sultan approved the drafted code of laws (Lineham 1936: 118f.).
Subsequently Clifford took over all parts of government that were 
necessary to run the state and to secure the flow of revenues. His ac-
tions ranged from controlling who received concessions on land (buffalo 
breeding, rice and sugar plantations) and mines (mostly tin, also salt) 
to ‘requesting’ the Sultan to impose quarantine regulations when the 
cholera raged in the neighboring state of Trengganu, which was under 
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the control of Siam. But the British interference did not stop at econom-
ic policy, but – as can be seen above – changed the political landscape 
of Pahang dramatically by reorganizing the provinces, changing their 
borders and turning law-enforcement over to the local chiefs and village 
headmen. All of the documented measures show how heavily the Brit-
ish interfered in the state of Pahang, not only taking over governmental 
business, but restructuring the state of Pahang itself – a state sovereign 
de jure, but not in exercise.
However, the agent was not able to bring order to the state. There 
were numerous cases of maladministration, injustice and corruption by 
the Sultan. Instances of these include: an English-Chinese business-
man, who fell in disgrace with the Sultan was murdered and his prop-
erty ceased illegally; the Sultan ignored rightful lines of succession and 
promoted people who were close to him instead; he stalled the imple-
mentation of the new law code and especially the transfer of law-en-
forcement-power to the chiefs and village headmen; former traditional 
judges (Bendaharas) were not stopped from interfering with newly ap-
pointed judges. The British agent was annoyed with the Sultan’s malad-
ministration, especially the lapses that disturbed the legal certainty of 
the state and therefore scared off investors. The absence of commercial 
development in turn was detrimental to the growth of British revenues.
In particular the murder of the important English-Chinese business-
man, an English subject, caused the relationship between the Sultan 
and the British to deteriorate. On 24th August 1888, Sultan Ahmad, 
the ruler of Pahang, surrendered to the growing pressure of the British 
and wrote a letter to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Cecil 
Clementi Smith, in which he apologized for the murder of the Chinese 
business man, Go Hui, who was close to the agent, and requested that 
a British Resident be sent to his country to assist in the government of 
his state:
We make known to our friend, with reference to the correspondence between 
ourself and our friend that we have reconsidered our friend’s words, and all that 
our friend has written. We have also had time to consult with our relation His 
Highness the Sultan of Johor. Our friend will remember that we have already 
acknowledged our responsibility for the murder of Go Hui, a British subject. 
We hope that no more will be said about this matter, and that Her Majesty the 
Queen will be satisfied with our expression of regret for what has occurred, and 
with our giving a guarantee for the future, that is to say, that Her Majesty the 
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Queen should send us a British Officer in order that he may assist us in matters 
relating to the Government of our country, on a similar system to that existing 
in the Malay States under English protection. We now ask for such an Officer. In 
asking this we trust that the British Government will assure to us and our suc-
cessors all our proper privileges and powers according to our system of govern-
ment, and will undertake that they will not interfere with the old customs of our 
country which have good and proper reasons, and also with all matters relating 
to our religion. There is nothing more but our best respects to our friend.
That illustrates how the Residency system, conceived and developed 
in India, came into existence in Southeast Asia. The concept of it was 
transferred to the Malay states, the practice, however, turned out to be 
different, as will be shown in the comparison later.
Hyderabad
Hyderabad was the most important princely state in India (Leonard 
2003: 364). After the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the British East In-
dia Company was abolished as ruler of British India and replaced by 
the British Crown in 1858. Until then the princely states still enjoyed 
a distinct measure of sovereignty under the regency of the Company. 
External affairs would be conducted by the Company. Regarding internal 
affairs of the state the Company limited its political influence on matters 
that might directly or indirectly influence their business, such as legis-
lature on taxation, customs duty or in rare cases the composition of the 
cabinet. Internal affairs beyond that were not interfered with and were 
left under the control of the local ruling elite. That changed with the 
coming into power of the British Crown. From this point forward a trend 
towards more political influence and certain hierarchical superiority over 
the native princes emerged. To justify this development theoretically, 
the ideology of paramountcy, which had been conceived of as early as 
1820, was employed (Ramusack 2004: 55). Central to it was that the 
native princes of India were de jure no longer equal partners of the Brit-
ish, but now undoubtedly hierarchically placed underneath the British 
Crown – that is, from 1877 onwards, the Empress of India. By choos-
ing this title the British now overtly and officially replaced the Mughal 
dominion and ended the era of imperial Muslim rule in South Asia. The 
absolute supremacy of the former Mughal Emperor over every other 
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Indian regent was transferred to the British Crown in order to legitimize 
the subordination of the native princes under the British. What para-
mountcy meant exactly and what it did not mean, was never defined by 
the British. Thus this concept was extensively used to justify whichever 
measure they deemed beneficial to their interests (ibid.: 56).
The principle of British paramountcy also applied to the Nizam (rul-
er) of Hyderabad – from 1857 to 1869, Nizam Afzal-ud-Daula, Asaf Jah 
V. Because he had been the premier prince of India due to the status 
of Hyderabad, he was still assured a special status towards the British, 
which was nonetheless a subordinate one. While Hyderabad had until 
1857 been the most sovereign among the princely states, the Brit-
ish interference in state affairs grew constantly during the following 
15 years. Although the British followed a non-annexation policy after 
the Rebellion in 1857, their political influence over Hyderabad was in-
creased as much as the framework of indirect rule allowed it and by 
1869/1870 Hyderabad had been completely subordinated.
In analyzing which parts of native government the British did and 
did not dominate, contemporary political categories must be used with 
caution. The courtly center of power was not divided into the three gov-
ernmental branches of a modern state; it did not know the separation 
of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches. What could 
be found there was a dyadic division with the judiciary on the one hand 
and what we know as legislature and executive on the other hand, both 
embodied by the cabinet. Even though in the princely state of Hyder-
abad the executive and legislature partly overlapped in the cabinet, we 
will see that the Resident, while mainly dominating the legislature, had 
little success in interfering in the executive, that is the daily administra-
tion of the state and above all the law enforcing institutions. While in 
general the Resident’s interference in state affairs grew, the judiciary 
was usually left untouched under the dogma of respecting native cus-
toms. The following part will illustrate how the British expanded their 
political power over Hyderabad and how this state thus gradually lost 
more of its sovereignty. I will sort the developments into the ones re-
garding legislature, executive and judiciary and will start with the first 
of the three.
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The map, taken from Robinson (1989: 117), shows the South Asian subcontinent around 1900. It is clearly vis-
ible how roughly half of the British imperial dominion in India consisted of indirectly ruled native states with 
Hyderabad at its center.
In 1858, the Resident at that time, Davidson, asked the Nizam to 
change his seal by removing the pledge of allegiance to the Mughal Em-
peror from it. The Nizam concurred. Even though he had been loyal to 
the British during the Indian Rebellion in 1857 and was already de facto 
subordinate, the British still inclined to also make him a legal feudatory 
of the Queen by awarding him the status of a Knight of the Star of India. 
To fight his legal and especially his ritual subordination to the Queen, 
he tried to change the inscription on his coins by adding a symbol of the 
prophet Muhammad. So far Hyderabad had been the last princely state 
to enjoy the sovereignty of having its own coinage. But now Viceroy 
Canning harshly declined such a measure by bluntly expressing that 
“any change in the coinage designed to defy Her Majesty’s supremacy 
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was an unfriendly act” (Ray 1988: 34).
One of the few important genuine rights the native ruling elite had 
left de jure, was the right of determining the Nizam’s successor. How-
ever, with the growing distrust towards their Indian subjects that the 
Rebellion had sown among the British, they tightened their grip to not 
risk another uprising. To gain or maintain the support of the native 
states’ ruling elites, the British changed the laws of succession with a 
so-called adoption sanad, so that thenceforth it would be possible for an 
heirless ruler to adopt a successor according to the respective Muslim 
or Hindu laws. In the case of Hyderabad, Viceroy Canning handed this 
legislation over to the Nizam before the former left office in 1862. In do-
ing so the British made clear, that they were regulating the succession 
of the Nizam hereafter.
One incident gives an insightful example of governmental business 
that is of primary concern to the British – economic policy. In the 1860s 
Hyderabad’s fields stayed dry due to a long drought and the situation 
grew precarious as the threat of people dying from hunger became seri-
ous. In order to avert a famine, the Nizam ordered to grow less cotton 
and grow grain instead and prohibited the export of grain so that there 
would be enough for the people of Hyderabad not to starve and its price 
would drop to make it affordable. This had heavy impact on the market 
for grain and cotton both in and outside Hyderabad. The grain prices on 
the regional markets in Bombay and Madras rose drastically and there-
fore disturbed the British business and jeopardized their revenues. To 
curb that, the Resident in Hyderabad, Yule, quickly intervened and at his 
urging the Nizam abolished the transit dues for grain and the ban on ex-
porting it. Lifting the ban in turn led to much higher grain prices within 
Hyderabad and to suffering among its people, much to the displeasure 
of the Nizam and his Dewar, the head of the cabinet, Chief Minister Salar 
Jung I. This example perfectly illustrates the core of colonialism – “ex-
tracting economically valuable commodities from unwilling [native] pro-
ducers” (Tarling 1992: 94) while depriving them of a share of the profit 
made of their land and work, regardless of their needs.
In the field of criminal prosecution a surprisingly fair treaty between 
Hyderabad and British India came to be as a result of an already on 
going practice. Fair, because it treated both parties equally in terms of 
their rights and duties towards each other. During the time before that 
treaty it was a common phenomenon that persons who had commit-
ted a crime under the dominion of one party fled to the territory of the 
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other one. So criminals would flee British prosecution by escaping to 
Hyderabad and vice versa. In 1862, Salar Jung requested that a mur-
derer who had escaped to British India be surrendered to Hyderabad. 
The British government in Bombay requested certain evidence to proof 
the alleged murderer’s guilt before surrendering him. That was done 
and the criminal was extradited to Hyderabad. This procedure served as 
model for the later treaty. In 1867 an extradition treaty designed under 
the principle of reciprocity of British India and Hyderabad was signed. 
While it has been shown above that the British’ power over legisla-
tive terms was extensive, their influence over the administrational part 
of the government or what would be the executive in modern states was 
much smaller. The Nizam accepted the fact that through the Resident 
the British in large parts dominated the law-making process of Hyder-
abad. They were however unable to do the same in the law-enforcement 
branch, as examples shall demonstrate below.
The cabinet of Hyderabad, that had been the official policy-maker in 
the state, consisted exclusively of native members with Salar Jung as 
its head. It had to ‘consult’ the Resident on all vital governmental busi-
ness before passing a law. That means that the British, through their 
Resident in Hyderabad, could at all time and regarding every matter in-
terfere in the legislation of this state. This deprivation of the sovereignty 
it had possessed before the British intervention could not be kept secret 
from its people and thus, large parts of the people – unlike their elites – 
cultivated a deep hatred for the British. This development culminated in 
an incidence in 1859, when after a durbar an Indian man tried to assas-
sinate the Resident, Davidson, on the street by gunfire and when that 
failed charged on him with a drawn sword. This was part of a larger plot 
to attempt a coup d’etat by assassinating the Nizam and destroying the 
Residency. While this conspiracy itself was being taken very seriously 
both by the British and the native government, its existence however 
was no surprise to them. What sheds light on the Resident’s lack of pow-
er over the police force is that after the conspirators were apprehended, 
the leader of the group managed to escape the custody of the police and 
fled. This was only made possible with help and support from within the 
police force, which shared sympathy for the perpetrators of the attack 
(Ray 1988: 37). Evidently the Resident did not have enough power over 
the police to prevent an assassination attempt on him during an official 
ceremony and to bring the key-perpetrators of this attack to justice.
Another important development within the executive branch that 
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the British were unable to prevent, even though it was strongly con-
trary to their interests, was the advancement and reform of the Hy-
derabad army. Chief-Minister Salar Jung was very progressive and the 
Temple-Jung administration (Resident Temple and native Head of Cabi-
net Salar Jung) gained a reputation of bringing modernization to the 
state. While the two men worked together very closely and with much 
success for instance in reforming the land revenue system, the dis-
pensation of justice, the police, the education system, sanitation and 
state finances (ibid.: 54), Salar Jung also pushed reforms on his own 
in the military sector of his state, much to the disliking of the British 
(ibid.: 55). Under his aegis the Hyderabad army became more profes-
sional and more modern by being equipped and trained with up-to-date 
weaponry. Also their numbers were increased, their structure tightened 
and they thenceforth went under the name “reformed troops”. It is 
easy to comprehend, that all this was contrary to British interests. They 
did not want the native states to have larger armies than was neces-
sary to fulfill state-internal purposes. Especially since they had just 
experienced the colonial nightmare of an insurrection in 1857 and were 
afraid of a new uprising.
Apart from the potential future role of the Hyderabad army, that was 
already hard to reckon, renegade forces could also not be suppressed. 
Every nobleman in the state, including the Nizam, had his own irregu-
lar militia and their dimensions were constantly growing (ibid.) These 
troops posed another incalculable risk to the British and their policy of 
long-term stability in their colonies to allow long-term investments and 
thus long-term revenues. This was accompanied by a general atmo-
sphere of distrust towards native soldiers within their own British troops. 
The native soldiers’ loyalty was always doubted and it was feared that 
they might defect to the Hyderabad army in the case of an insurrection. 
As the cases above show, between 1857 and 1869 the British interfered 
strongly and constantly in the legislation of Hyderabad. They changed 
the Nizam’s status and made him inferior to the Queen of the United 
Kingdom, who became the Empress of India in 1877; they interfered 
in the design of Hyderabad’s coinage; they took control over the suc-
cession of the Nizam; they controlled the export of the state and they 
negotiated an extradition treaty. They were however unable to assert 
dominance over the law-enforcement branch of the administration – 
much due to the sovereignty and political skills of Hyderabad’s chief-
minister Salar Jung – and did not interfere in the judiciary.
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On February 26th 1869, Nizam Afzal-ud-Daula died, leaving behind 
an only two year old son and heir, Mir Mahbub Ali Khan. The death of 
this stubborn ruler, who was often annoyed by the British interference 
and constantly wanted to curb it – usually without success – marked 
the end of Hyderabad’s relative autonomy and allowed the British to 
tighten their grip around this princely state. Following the principles 
laid out in one of Governor-General Mayo’s dispatches, Resident Saun-
ders took over guardianship of the infant Nizam in order to western-
ize him and therefore ensure unfettered British paramountcy over the 
state, when the Nizam would grow up and take over government. 
While the young heir was educated in a western way, the official rulers 
of Hyderabad as proxies of the Nizam were two noblemen: Salar Jung 
and the very popular Amir-i-Kabir. At this point the British had brought 
Hyderabad under total paramountcy. Hereafter no measure was ever 
initiated without approval of the Resident; the infant Nizam – undeni-
ably the legal heir to the throne – was only proclaimed after reference 
was made to the Resident. To emphasize this newly gained authority, 
accustomed ritual behavior was changed, so that the Nizam was given 
less reference by the Resident. To honor the deceased Nizam a con-
dolence durbar was held. It was customary to take off one’s shoes at 
a durbar and the members of the British entourage had respected this 
custom until then. From now on however, Resident Saunders refused 
to take off his shoes and the British attendees sat on chairs instead of 
sitting on the ground like all the members of a durbar traditionally did 
(ibid.: 59). This disrespect of native customs and breach of the official 
British policy of giving increased symbolic reverence to the native ruler 
and complying with native customs fortified the status of the Brit-
ish above the Nizam and the latter’s status underneath the Resident. 
Thenceforth at durbars the British sat on chairs and therefore higher 
than all the native members present.
Comparing the two cases
The case of Hyderabad spans from 1857 to the Nizam’s death in 1869 
and the Pahang case covers the years 1887 and 1888. While the two 
cases may be 18 years apart, historically they fall in the same period 
of colonialism – that of the post-Mutiny era of paramountcy3 – and 
thus are very well comparable. Both lie somewhat on the periphery 
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of the British Empire, if not geographically then politically4, and are 
subject to the British non-intervention policy of that time or rather 
non-annexation policy.
The point of view from which both cases shall be compared is that 
of their degree of sovereignty or, viewed from the opposite side, the 
degree of British interference in the native states’ governance. Simply 
looking at their official status and sorting them into Low’s scheme of 
the ‘colonial power-native state’ relationship does not bear any in-
sightful conclusions, because not rarely did so-called protected, na-
tive, princely or protracted states only keep the name of a sovereign 
state and were in fact annexed into a foreign empire. That is why, to 
circumvent this problem of name-fact discrepancy, a somewhat deep-
er analysis is necessary in order to determine a state’s degree of sov-
ereignty. To achieve that, analytically the native states’ governmental 
business is divided into the three branches of government – execu-
tive, legislature, judiciary. As mentioned previously, this is done with 
great caution as these categories can only be applied provisorily to a 
state that is not modern and does not know the separation of powers. 
These categories enable the author to measure the degree of British 
government-interference and this way facilitate a comparison of the 
two cases to ultimately and ideally draw a conclusion, which state was 
less sovereign in the given period of time.
One point was left undescribed in the case studies above, because it 
can in a sense be taken for granted considering that it was always the 
first measure taken in any case of indirect rule and therefore a com-
monality also among the two cases here – the takeover of a state’s for-
eign relations. Apart from that, the legislation of the two native states 
Hyderabad and Pahang bears witness to foreign intervention the most. 
The respective Indian and Malay rulers both were subject to a change 
of their status. The Nizam in Hyderabad was made subordinate to the 
British Queen and the ruler in Pahang was granted the title of Sultan. 
However, this is where the commonalities end. While in the princely state 
the British interfered heavily in policies of economy, the legal succession 
of the Nizam and arranged an extradition treaty, in the Malay state they 
changed the structural design of the state itself. The provinces were re-
organized and their borders were changed. Lands, concessions, warrants 
and judicial power were taken away from the local chiefs and therefore 
shook up the traditional order of society. The coastal borders of the state 
were reduced and the law enforcement put in the local chief’s hands. 
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These measures put the rule of the Sultan at great risk as it was uproot-
ing all the intermediary structures he ultimately depended on.
In the executive branch, too, Pahang saw much more interference 
by the Resident. While the Hyderabad British agent had no influence 
over the police force, Hyderabad’s army or the numerous militias, in 
Pahang the British managed to organize the local law-enforcement very 
well. Also they managed the resources of the state by granting livestock 
breeding, plantation and mining concessions usually to British, Chinese 
or Indian companies. While it was unnecessary to limit Hyderabad’s 
trade to British partners only, as Hyderabad had no coastal line and 
was surrounded by the British sphere of influence anyway, in Pahang 
the state and its people were prohibited to trade with other European 
powers and the state’s currency was limited to a volume that would not 
threaten the British Malayan currency as lead currency of the region.
The British dogma of leaving native customs and tradition untouched 
usually meant a policy of non-interference with jurisdiction. That was 
very much the case in Hyderabad, where no intervention in the local 
courts’ business has been documented in the examined period of time. 
The opposite was the case in Pahang. Here the British shaped the ju-
dicial landscape majorly by introducing a new, Islamic penal code and 
installing a high court in the state’s capital.
As can be seen above, the intensity of interference in the govern-
mental business of a native state was much higher in the Malay case of 
Pahang than in the Indian case of Hyderabad. The Resident in Pahang 
ran the government almost completely by 1888. That shows that the 
degree of sovereignty was much lower in Southeast Asian Pahang than 
in South Asian Hyderabad. This result is in accordance with the research 
done on indirect rule in South and Southeast Asia during the colonial era.
Scholars have attempted to explain the difference of British interfer-
ence between South Asia and the Malay states by analyzing the struc-
ture and stability of the respective states in order to draw conclusions as 
to why it was easier to gain control over one state, when it was harder 
in another. One argument is that Indian kingdoms were much more 
complex and intact upon the arrival of colonial forces. Hence they were 
harder to bring under control, as for instance in the case of the institu-
tion of wahils. These were emissaries that noblemen posted to each 
other’s court. They served to hold a direct line of communication be-
tween the rulers of neighboring states. When the British started to bring 
these states under their control, the first thing they tried, was to control 
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a state’s foreign relations. The Indian rulers were reluctant to that and 
for some time managed to circumvent the lines of foreign communica-
tion, the British had forced upon them as the only channels of political 
communication with foreign states, with mentioned wahils. In contrast, 
many of the political entities on the Malay peninsula, Sumatra, Java and 
Borneo were unstable. Some had experienced drastic changes in their 
political system, some were simply new and not yet fully established 
and some were victim to systematic corruption (Tarling 1992: 96). This 
allowed the British to take over control more easily and to interfere 
more deeply to the local government, transcending the boundaries of 
foreign intervention that were set in Indian native states.
Conclusion
In indirectly ruled territories of India the British colonial agents exerted 
moderate influence compared to the Malay region. Firstly, they assumed 
power over a state’s foreign affairs. Conducting outside communication 
for a state and deciding whether or not a state would go to war was cru-
cial for the colonial authority. This would keep a state from crossing the 
colonizer’s interests in the region. Apart from this, the British allowed 
themselves the right to also interfere in a native state’s internal affairs, 
when it saw maladministration or claimed to see objectionable injustice. 
Making sure a state was correctly administered was of utmost impor-
tance to a colonial power to ensure its revenues kept flowing and would 
not get lost in corrupt bureaucratic structures or vanish completely due 
to mismanagement of the land.
In the Malayan dependencies of the Crown, the British went much 
further than interfering and took over central domains of the domestic 
government permanently. The Resident, who was under the control of 
the Governor in Singapore, exercised authority over the local police, 
the judicial branch, and every other important part of state government 
(Sadka 1962). This stands in stark contrast to the case in Hyderabad, 
where we have seen that the Resident had no control over the police 
force and was in fact victim to an attempted assassination in which 
the police was involved. While a Resident usually, although exercising 
control de facto, de jure only advised the local ruler and members of 
cabinet, in Perak, for instance, the latter were legally bound to follow 
his advice without objection by Article VI of the Pangkor Engagement 
FORUM: COMPARING HYDERABAD AND PAHANG
461
of 1874. This is an exceptional characteristic of indirect rule over the 
Malayan native states – that the Residency system came into existence 
through treaties and that the native authorities were not only subordi-
nate to the Resident politically, but also legally. Solely aspects of gov-
ernment that were deemed unimportant by the colonial authority, such 
as Malay customary and religious issues, had been left to the authority 
of the local government (Low 1973: 14). Unlike in the native states of 
India, the British took over much more of the domestic government in 
the Malay native states. Under their indirect rule the Malayan native 
states enjoyed much less or almost no sovereignty whereas the princely 
states of India could maintain power over certain important parts of 
government.
Endnotes
1 For extraterritoriality of the Residencies compare Fisher 
(1991:199).
2 The text of the treaty is taken from Lineham (1936:115ff.).
3 One may reasonably span this era from 1857, when the Indian  
Rebellion occurred to the beginning of the 20th century before the na-
tional movements, especially that of India, developed.
4 While Hyderabad obviously does not lie on the periphery of the 
British Empire geographically as it is surrounded by British India, the 
Empire‘s most precious colonial possession, both cases arguably lie on 
the Empire‘s periphery politically as they are only partly under British 
control as opposed to direct colonies of the Crown.
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